Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2021

Delegating or Divesting?
Philip A. Hamburger
Columbia Law School, hamburger@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, American Politics Commons, Constitutional Law Commons,
Law and Politics Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Philip A. Hamburger, Delegating or Divesting?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2764

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

Copyright 2020 by Philip Hamburger
Northwestern University Law Review

Vol. 115

DELEGATING OR DIVESTING?
Philip Hamburger
ABSTRACT—A gratifying feature of recent scholarship on administrative
power is the resurgence of interest in the Founding. Even the defenders of
administrative power hark back to the Constitution’s early history—most
frequently to justify delegations of legislative power. But the past offers cold
comfort for such delegation.
A case in point is Delegation at the Founding by Professors Julian
Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley. Not content to defend the Supreme
Court’s current nondelegation doctrine, the article employs history to
challenge the doctrine—arguing that the Constitution does not limit
Congress’s delegation of legislative power. But the article’s most central
historical claims are mistaken. For example, when quoting key eighteenthcentury authors, the article makes errors of omission and commission—
leaving out passages that contradict its position and misunderstanding the
passages it recites. The initial goal of this Essay is therefore to explain the
evidentiary mistakes in the attack on nondelegation.
This Essay’s broader aim, however, is conceptual: it points out two
basic principles that have thus far received insufficient attention from both
the defenders and opponents of administrative power.
First, the delegation problem can be understood more specifically as a
question of vesting. To be sure, the nondelegation doctrine should be put
aside—not on the grounds offered by Professors Mortenson and Bagley, but
because the Constitution speaks instead in stronger terms about vesting.
Thus, what are generically depicted as questions of delegation can be
understood more specifically in terms of vesting and divesting. It thereby
becomes apparent that Congress cannot vest in others, or divest itself of, any
power that the Constitution vests in it.
Second, it is necessary to draw attention to a much-neglected idea of
executive power. Recent scholarship has debated widely different
conceptions of executive power—Mortenson’s view, now echoed by Bagley,
being that executive power is an “empty vessel.” But all such scholarship
tends to ignore another conception of executive power: that it involves the
nation’s action, strength, or force. This understanding of executive power
has foundations in eighteenth-century thought—as revealed even by the
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authors quoted by Mortenson and Bagley. Indeed, it is the conception
asserted by Federalist Number 78 and evident in the Constitution itself.
A narrow historical inquiry thus points to broad conceptual lessons.
Both delegation and executive power need to be reconsidered on the basis of
the Constitution and its history.
AUTHOR—Philip Hamburger is the Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor
of Law at Columbia Law School, and President of the New Civil Liberties
Alliance.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent appearance of Delegation at the Founding (the Article) by
Professors Julian Davis Mortenson and Nicholas Bagley has already caused
a stir.1 Even the New Republic and The Atlantic have taken notice, for the
Article seems to bring good news from the past for the administrative state.2
According to the Article, the Constitution did not bar delegation. To be
precise, Mortenson and Bagley argue that, under the U.S. Constitution,

1
Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (as published on SSRN on May 26, 2020).
2
Matt Ford, The Plot to Level the Administrative State, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/156207/plot-level-administrative-state [https://perma.cc/N4S4-RZG2];
Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, There’s No Historical Justification for One of the Most
Dangerous
Ideas
in
American
Law,
ATLANTIC
(May
26,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/nondelegation-doctrine-orliginalism/612013/
[https://perma.cc/6DHS-BL3K]. Among other commentaries, see Robert Verbruggen, Is ‘Most of
Government’
Unconstitutional?,
NAT’L
REV.
(Jan.
9,
2020,
6:30
AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/01/nondelegation-doctrine-debate-is-most-governmentunconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/M8UU-75CS].
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although Congress cannot irrevocably “transfer” or “alienate” legislative
power, it can revocably “delegate” it.3
But is this true? “Not so fast,” argues Professor Ilan Wurman—joined
by others, such as Aaron Gordon and Rob Natelson.4 This Essay more
systematically questions the claims by Professors Mortenson and Bagley,
most basically on evidentiary grounds. The difficulty is not merely that their
the article misleadingly clusters together a near menagerie of eighteenthcentury sources, European as well as American, under the legitimizing rubric
of “what the Founders said.” Worse, when quoting eighteenth-century
authors, the Article makes errors of omission and commission—neglecting
passages that contradict its position and misreading the passages it recites.
The goal here, however, is not merely historical, but conceptual. Rather
than defend the nondelegation doctrine from unmerited historical attack, this
Essay aims, on a more positive note, to reveal some fresh perspectives that
both the defenders and the opponents of administrative power have yet to
recognize. What is needed is not merely better history, but a
reconceptualization of the debates over delegation and executive power.
Part I argues that generic discussions of delegation should give way to
a more accurate analysis in terms of vesting. Much evidence utilized by
Mortenson and Bagley does not support, and often contradicts, their prodelegation conclusions. But the nondelegation doctrine should be put aside
on other grounds—namely, that the Constitution speaks of vested rather than
delegated powers. Although nondelegation has strong foundations in early
political theory, the Supreme Court’s nondelegation doctrine has weak
foundations in the Constitution, because the Constitution speaks instead in
much stronger terms about vesting. The Constitution vests legislative powers
in Congress, and that body therefore cannot vest in others, or divest itself of,
the powers that the Constitution vests in it.5 Accordingly, generic questions
about delegation must be understood, in the context of the Constitution, to
involve more specific concerns about vesting.

3

Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 3, 22, 31.
Ilan Wurman, N o Nondelegation at the Founding? Not So Fast, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/no-nondelegation-at-the-founding-not-so-fastby-ilan-wurman/ [https://perma.cc/2X78-B7W8]; Aaron Gordon, A Rebuttal to ‘Delegation at the
Founding’ (July 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Rob Natelson, How Much Power
May Congress Delegate to Federal Agencies?, INDEP. INST. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://i2i.org/how-muchpower-may-congress-delegate-to-federal-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/W994-KEF5]; see also Christopher
J. Walker, The Mortenson-Bagley-Wurman Debate on Nondelegation and Originalism, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-mortenson-bagley-wurmandebate-on-nondelegation-and-originalism/ [https://perma.cc/263J-4229].
5
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
4
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Part II then suggests a more accurate understanding of executive power
as the nation’s action, strength, or force. Recent scholarship has debated
widely different conceptions of executive power—Mortenson’s view, now
echoed by Bagley, being that it is an “empty vessel,” which is open to
delegation.6 But recent scholarship tends to ignore a central conception of
executive power—as the nation’s action, strength, or force. This
understanding has deep foundations in eighteenth-century thought, not least
in the authors quoted by Mortenson and Bagley.7 Indeed, it is the conception
asserted by Federalist No. 78 and evident in the Constitution.8
Finally, Part III observes the failure of Mortenson and Bagley to engage
with the constitutional arguments on the other side and invites a more
relevant debate. Although my work has rejected any reliance on
nondelegation as a doctrine, the Mortenson and Bagley article oddly singles
out my scholarship for defending the nondelegation doctrine.9 In fact, this
Essay’s claims about vesting and divesting and about executive force have
both appeared in my prior writing, and the divesting argument was picked
up by Justice Gorsuch in Gundy v. United States.10 Nonetheless, the
Mortenson and Bagley article does not even acknowledge these key
arguments, let alone respond to them. If the debate were really still the same
as in the 1930s, the Article would be on point. But the debate has been
shifting in recent years, and the Article’s failure to recognize and confront
current ideas about vesting and divesting and about executive force leaves
the impression that it is an assault more on the dead than on the living. This
Essay, in short, proposes a reconceptualized debate—one that engages with
the Constitution’s long misunderstood but crucial principles of vesting and
executive power.
I.

NOT DELEGATION, BUT DIVESTING

Does the Constitution really permit congressional delegation of
legislative powers? Notwithstanding the Mortenson and Bagley article, the
6
Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2019) (arguing that “the first sentence of Article II would have been
understood as vesting the wholly derivative authority to execute the laws, and nothing else” and surveying
alternatives); Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 4, 38, 40.
7
See infra Part II.A. For prior discussion of this idea, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW UNLAWFUL? 332–36 (2014).
8
See infra Part II.B.
9
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 15–16, 79 n.286.
10
See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Accepting, then, that we have
an obligation to decide whether Congress has unconstitutionally divested itself of its legislative
responsibilities, the question follows: What’s the test? . . . [W]e apply the major questions doctrine in
service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring
that power to an executive agency.”).
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historical evidence does not support any such conclusion. Indeed, the
Constitution suggests that one should focus not merely on generic questions
about delegation and nondelegation, but more specifically on vesting and
divesting.
A. Really “What the Founders Said”?
The Article’s main conceptual framework comes in an account of “what
the Founders said.”11 But does it really offer evidence about what the
Founders said?
Delegation. On the question of whether legislative power could be
delegated, the Article relies on curiously few statements from the framing
and ratification of the Constitution. For example, the Article relies on two
James Wilson quotations from after ratification about the people’s initial
delegation of power to the legislature—as if the people’s delegation of their
powers meant that their legislature could subdelegate such powers!12
Although the Article offers one Wilson quotation from the Pennsylvania
ratification convention, that passage addresses the English constitution in the
sixteenth century and actually suggests criticism of legislative delegation.13
The Article also quotes James Kent during ratification speaking critically of
delegation under the English constitution.14 These are the only statements

11

Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 21.
The Article quotes Justice James Wilson’s lectures on society’s transfer of powers to government
as if this were dispositive about any subdelegation. Id. at 27 (“All these powers and rights, indeed, cannot,
in a numerous and extended society, be exercised personally; but they may be exercised by representation.
One of those powers and rights is to make laws for the government of the nation. This power and right
may be delegated for a certain period, on certain conditions, under certain limitations, and to a certain
number of persons.”) (quoting James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE
JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 3, 190 (1804)). The Article also quotes Justice Wilson’s lectures on the chain of
representation—again, as if this were dispositive. Id. at 29 (“[r]epresentation is the chain of
communication between the people and those, to whom they have committed the important charge of
exercising the delegated powers necessary for the administration of publick affairs. This chain may consist
of one link, or of more links than one; but it should always be sufficiently strong and discernible.”)
(quoting Wilson, supra, at 430).
13
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 29, 29 n.104 (“So that when that body [Parliament] was so
base and treacherous to the rights of the people as to transfer the legislative authority to Henry VIII, his
exercising that authority by proclamations and edicts could not strictly speaking be termed
unconstitutional.”).
14
Id. at 30–31, n.111 (“[T]he people even under Henry the 8th were insensible to the importance of
their voice in parliament, . . . and the House was composed of a most abject set of slaves, who by a single
act the most extraordinary that ever was recorded, conferred on the King’s proclamations the force of
law.”) (quoting James Kent, A Country Federalist, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J. (1787), reprinted in 19
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 434 (John P. Kaminski,
Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber, & Margaret A. Hogan eds., 2003)).
12
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from the framing and ratification that appear in the Article’s nineteen pages
on “what the Founders said” about delegation.15 Really, that’s all there is.
So, the Article’s central evidence consists of two quotations from the
framing and ratification that do not support the Article’s claim about
delegation. Indeed, to the extent they suggest anything, they tend (as noted
above in italics) to cut against that claim.
To be sure, the Article quotes several other early Americans. In
particular, it quotes Aequus, Benjamin Franklin, James Otis, and Daniel
Shute in the 1750s and 1760s,16 and Thomas Jefferson arguing against
delegation in the early 1780s.17 But each of these individuals were writing in
circumstances very different from ratification in the late 1780s and on
questions very different from congressional delegation under the U.S.
Constitution.18 The only other quotations are from a few court cases in the
1880s and 1890s.19
Recognizing the limited American evidence—let alone from the
framing and ratification of the Constitution—the Article admits: “While the
total number of instances is not large, scattered references . . . can be found
in the colonial, framing, and ratification records.”20 That’s right. In the end,
the American sources are “scattered references,” and as already hinted, those
actually from the framing or ratification (by Wilson and Kent) do not support
the argument.
Everything else in the nineteen pages on “what the Founders said” about
the delegation of legislative power comes from Europeans.21 Of course, prior
European thought, if correctly understood, can be very revealing. But it is
important to be clear at the outset that the Founders and their European
forbears are not the same.

15

Id. at 21–39.
The Article quotes Aequus on the delegation of legislative power to the colonies, id. at 29; Franklin
on the delegation of local power to municipal corporations, id. at 30, n.108; Otis on colonial governance,
id. at 37; and Shute on the community’s initial delegation to government. Id. at 37.
17
Id. at 37 (“Thomas Jefferson, for example, savaged legislative proposals to create a dictatorship
during the revolutionary war by arguing that the ‘laws [of nature] forbid the abandonment of [legislative
responsibility], even on ordinary occasions; and much more a transfer of their powers into other hands
and other forms, without consulting the people.’”) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE
OF VIRGINIA 135 (Univ. N.C. 2006) (1788), https://docsouth.unc.edu/southlit/jefferson/jefferson.html
[https://perma.cc/4T4J-DEKF]).
18
See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
19
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 38–39.
20
Id. at 37.
21
Some of the European scholarship on which the Article relies includes the works of Montesquieu,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke, William Blackstone, William Burgh, Algernon Sidney, and David
Hume, among others. Id. at 25–34.
16
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What is one to make of this? The Article goes out of its way to critique
my work for relying so much on European sources,22 but when explaining
what the Founders said about delegation, it relies heavily on European and
other indirect evidence.23 In fact, there is no evidence actually on point from
the framing and ratification in the Article.
Though it is tempting to suggest that scholars in European glass houses
should hesitate before throwing stones, this would be a distraction from more
serious points. Professors Mortenson and Bagley are to be commended for
relying so extensively on European theory, for this can often be useful for
understanding the Constitution, but in sweeping so much under the rug of
“what the Founders said,” their work goes awry. It conflates Americans with
Europeans, and what Americans said during the framing and ratification with
what they said in earlier circumstances. It thus founders in expounding the
Founders.
Articles of Confederation. Evidentiary problems persist when the
Article argues that rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization is an
exercise of executive power.24 Though the Article purports to be proving
“what the Founders said,” its evidence is based almost entirely on the powers
of the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation.
To be sure, one could describe American leaders under the Articles as
“Founders,” but the effect is to conflate what was said then about the
Continental Congress with what was said later about the Congress
established by the U.S. Constitution. What was said about one set of
problems is thus taken as evidence about a very different set of issues.
The Articles of Confederation were a treaty or contract among the
states.25 Thus, the Articles were not a constitutional law, and they did not
authorize the Continental Congress to make law. Instead, as the Articles
repeatedly revealed, the Continental Congress only had authority to make
“determinations”—a euphemism for decisions that were not really statutes.26
Even formal congressional acts under the Articles did not have legal
obligation.27 Eventually, James Madison became so frustrated with this that
22

See id. at 15.
Id. at 25–34.
24
See id. at 39.
25
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (establishing a “firm league of friendship” between
the states).
26
Id. at art. XIII, para. 1. (“Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in
Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them.”).
27
This is why the Articles ended with the delegates reciting: “[A]nd we do further solemnly plight
and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the
23
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he claimed that congressional determinations, especially congressional
requisitions to the states for revenue, should be understood as “a law to the
States”—an argument that did not persuade the states, or even his ally
Alexander Hamilton, but that Mortenson and Bagley take as evidence that
the Continental Congress enjoyed legislative power.28 Far from proving that
Congress had legislative power, their reliance on this Madison quotation
confirms the opposite conclusion.
Congress, in contrast, was established by the U.S. Constitution with
only legislative powers.29 This is not a surprise, as it was adopted precisely
to reject the Articles of Confederation and its misbegotten Continental
Congress. What, then, is the relevance of that old congress?
Rather than face this problem, the Article uses discussions of the
Continental Congress to suggest the fluidity of legislative and executive
power under the U.S. Constitution.30 To this end, it even argues that the
Continental Congress enjoyed all three powers of government, including
legislative power.31 But that is exactly what the Continental Congress did not
have. Though some Americans strained to attribute legislative power to that
Congress, the Articles of Confederation only gave the Congress elements of
executive and judicial powers. The Continental Congress therefore cannot
supply evidence about the delegation of legislative power.
Whether in relying on American discussions of the Continental
Congress or European delegation theory, the Article makes the mistake of
trying to reduce these sources to “what the Founders said.” In other words,
it squeezes all sorts of quotations into what looks like a relevant pigeonhole

United States in Congress assembled, on all questions, which by the said confederation are submitted to
them.” Id. at art. XIII, para. 2. In 1787, it was observed that, “in no case, is Congress invested . . . with
legislative or judicial powers: And the reason is evident; the Confederation was not intended by any
means to consolidate the several states into one general Commonwealth.” Grand Committee,
Observations Upon the Seven Articles, N.Y. GAZETTEER (Jan 29, 1787), reprinted in 31 VA. INDEP.
CHRON. (Feb. 21, 1787) (on file with author).
28
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 51. For Hamilton’s views, see id. at 52.
29
U.S. CONST. art. I.
30
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 43 (arguing that those discussions “make nonsense of
originalist claims that government action must be neatly slotted under a single font of government
authority. Depending on the relationships you focused on, a given act could properly be classified as both
legislative and executive at the same time”).
31
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 43 (“[T]he Articles government was commonly understood
to possess all three powers of a complete government—albeit in notoriously ineffective form.”). In
claiming legislative power for the Continental Congress, the Article merely quotes the power of Congress
under the Articles to establish rules for deciding capture and prize cases. Id. at 44, n.150. But such rules
were more typically binding on foreigners than Americans, and Congress did not have general binding
domestic legislative power. To get over the reality that the Congressional Congress lacked legislative
power, the Article says that it was “commonly understood to possess” such power. Id. at 43. But that was
not the reality, as the authors appear to understand.
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without sorting out exactly why such evidence may or may not be relevant.
The result is a combination of inflated claims and weak evidence, which does
not inspire confidence.
B. Nondelegation Theory
On the assumption that European theory is relevant, how should it be
understood? As recognized by the Article’s focus on John Locke and
Thomas Rutherforth, English theory may be of particular importance for
interpreting the U.S. Constitution. It is therefore disturbing that in
expounding European theory—the bulk of the Article’s evidence on whether
legislative power could be delegated—the Mortenson and Bagley article
goes astray. It looks for a uniform distinction between revocable and
irrevocable transfers of power and thereby misreads the very sources on
which it most relies.
Revocable vs. Irrevocable. The Article recognizes that many early
political theorists, notably John Locke, argued against any legislative
alienation or transfer of legislative power.32 But rather than acknowledge that
Locke and many others worried about all sorts of legislative shifts of
legislative power, the Article argues that there was a pervasive distinction
between revocable and irrevocable grants.33
The Article contends that words such as “alienate” and “transfer” had a
fixed technical meaning in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European
theory. Allegedly, these terms referred to irrevocable assignments of power,
and in contrast, the term “delegation” referred only to revocable shifts of
power.34 On this basis, it is said that Locke did not object to delegation—
meaning a revocable transfer of legislative power—but only rejected
irrevocable transfers of legislative power.35 The Article concludes that the
U.S. Constitution should be read to permit Congress to shift its power as it
pleases as long as Congress can recall the power. As now will be seen,
however, the Article’s assumptions about European theory are dubious.

32

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
34
Id. at 32–34.
35
Id. at 31. (“Far from reflecting some pervasive view that legislative power could not be delegated,
the founding-era evidence thus indicates the opposite. That didn’t necessarily have to mean, however,
that legislatures were unconstrained in their disposition of rulemaking authority. A small handful of
writers did argue for one specific limitation, albeit one different in kind from modern nondelegation
doctrine. On the account of those who took this view, what was prohibited was legislatures’ permanent
alienation of legislative power without right of reversion or control. The best-known exposition of this
anti-alienation principle was probably Section 141 of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government.”).
33

96

115:88 (2020)

Delegating or Divesting?

Contested Concepts. The claim that there was a single pervasive view
about delegation across early Europe already suggests more than a little
overstatement. The Article finds an unvarying distinction between revocable
and irrevocable shifts of power from the time of Locke to the era of the
Constitution, observing that “writers, lawyers, and politicians repeatedly
surfaced the same distinction.”36 In this, however, the Article fails to observe
the degree to which, from the seventeenth through the eighteenth century,
there was disagreement about what could be delegated, and that this
disagreement concerned both levels of delegation: the initial delegation of
power from the people and any subsequent possible delegation from the
bodies in which the people placed their power.
The failure to recognize the range of disagreement is particularly
disappointing because it misses the extent to which in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century England there was widespread, though not complete,
distrust of an unlimited power of delegation to, or within, government.
From the monarchical perspective, there certainly were limits on
delegation. In at least some monarchical theory, the people could and
perhaps had to delegate their power to the monarch, and once they had
conceded power to him, they arguably could not withdraw it. And some of
the monarch’s prerogatives—such as the pardon power—were so inherently
personal that he could not alienate them.37
From a more popular point of view—most notably elaborated by John
Locke and later picked up by Americans—the people, by the law of nature,
could not delegate so much power as to give up their right of selfpreservation.38 In other words, they could not irrevocably dispose of their
powers. But that was not all. When, by means of the Constitution, the people
established their legislature, the legislature had no authority to alter their
constitution and therefore could not delegate its power.39 Of course, there
were yet other perspectives, but these monarchical and more popular visions
should suffice here to suggest the range of possibilities.
Tellingly, neither political party in England was so devoted to any point
of view as to be unwilling to shift gears when it suited them. By means of
the 1716 Septennial Act, a Whig Parliament elected for three years extended
its own life to seven years.40 The three-year Parliament was thereby
36

Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 36.
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 380–82.
38
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 429 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1960) (1690). Here and in subsequent quotations from Locke, capitalization and italics are modernized,
except where they seem to illuminate the argument.
39
See infra text accompanying notes 48–49.
40
Septennial Act 1716, 2 Geo. 1 c. 38 (Eng.).
37
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understood to have delegated its power to a seven-year Parliament—a
delegation that remained revocable until the end of Parliament’s initial, three
year term. The delegation prompted at least one Tory to quote John Locke
against any delegation. Reciting Locke’s familiar assumption that “[t]he
power of the legislative” was “derived from the people by a positive
voluntary grant and institution,” John Snell—a Tory from Gloucester—
further quoted that the “legislative,” meaning the legislature, “can be no
other[] than what that positive grant conveyed” and that “the legislative can
have no power of transferring their authority of making laws, and place it in
other hands.”41 Though this suggests some hypocrisy, it more interestingly
reveals the degree to which principles against any sort of legislative
delegation were widely familiar, even among those who would not ordinarily
be identified with such a perspective.
Thus, even before one gets to the particular European theorists most
relied upon by the Article, it is important to recognize just how implausible
it is for the Article to suggest a monolithic European view on delegation.
There were diverse points of view, which recognized the varied
circumstances in which power was delegated. For example, not only was the
people’s delegation distinguishable from their legislature’s delegation but
also the legislature’s delegation of local legislative power to a municipal
corporation or colony could be differentiated from its delegation of national
legislative power.42 In each of these circumstances, Europeans could and did
disagree. It is therefore deeply confused, and apt to lead to a misreading of
sources, to assume a unity of thought.43
John Locke. Consider Locke’s Two Treatises of Government—a crucial
text for early Americans.44 As already noted by Professor Wurman, Locke at
41

HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 382.
Id. at 388–89 (regarding municipal power).
43
In a mirror image of its peculiar claim of a near-consensus permitting delegation, the Article
claims that those who disagree must show a near consensus against delegation: “For originalists to carry
their argument, the historical evidence ought to show that most everyone at the founding would have
understood the Constitution to bar the delegation of too much power or power of the wrong kind.”
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 22. Really, “most everyone”? Good grief. Just to illustrate how
wrongheaded this is, consider that the Constitution, being adopted merely by majorities, often gave
effect to contested ideas, which it presented in contested language. Though the majorities might prevail
in establishing their ideas in their phrasing, it should be no surprise that this engendered further disputes
about the words and their meaning. It is therefore very odd to claim that anyone who disagrees with the
Article must show a near-consensus, and this is especially comic as the Article’s own evidence is not
only weak, but often cuts against its thesis.
44
For a brief sampling of the scholarship, see John Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and
America in the Eighteenth Century, in POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL THEORY 53 (2002); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE,
LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990); JEROME HUYLER, LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE
42
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least sometimes clearly meant a revocable delegation when he wrote against
the “transfer” of legislative power.45 But the evidence goes much further.
Elsewhere in his book, Locke squarely addressed the question of
delegation and wrote in unmistakable terms: “freedom of men under
government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of
that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it.”46 That is, the
rules governing society had to be made by the legislature erected by the
people. Locke also wrote: “The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no
other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what
that legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it.”47 Such ideas
resonated with Americans.48
Indeed, Locke explained that governments are “dissolved from within”
when “the legislative”—meaning the legislature—is “altered”:
The Constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society,
whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the
direction of persons, and bonds of laws made by persons authorized to
thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one
man, or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws, that
should be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to
make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws
without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey.49

The dissolution of government was, of course, the opportunity for revolution,
and Locke’s first example of this situation was when laws are made by
persons who are not appointed as lawmakers by the people.
It is therefore passing strange to claim that Locke’s principles left room
for a legislature to transfer legislative power to other bodies, as long as the
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUNDING ERA (1995); C. BRADLEY THOMPSON, AMERICA’S
REVOLUTIONARY MIND: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE DECLARATION
THAT DEFINED IT 21–37 (2019); Merle Curti, The Great Mr. Locke: America’s Philosopher, 1783–
1861, HUNTINGTON LIBR. BULL. 107 (1937).
45
Wurman, supra note 4 (“Mortenson and Bagley’s entire argument about Locke is that he was
arguing that the people delegated their power to the legislature and did not alienate their power, as
absolutists like Jean Bodin had argued. And now we see that in section 135, when Locke is talking about
this original delegation (not alienation), he uses the word ‘transfer.’ In section 135, then, ‘transfer’ means
delegation, not alienation.”) (internal citations omitted).
46
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 302.
47
Id.
48
For a hint as to how such ideas were studied by Americans, note that the first quotation in the
paragraph above was copied out in 1778, with other passages from Locke, by George Gilmer, an
American officer in Virginia. GEORGE GILMER, COMMONPLACE BOOK 122–23, 132 (before May 1778),
Virginia Historical Society, Mss 5:5, G4213:1.
49
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 425–26.
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transfer was revocable. His principles clearly barred any shift in legislative
power.
And, of course, this was the most famous eighteenth-century
application of Locke’s theory about the shifting of legislative power. Recall
the debates about the 1716 Septennial Act, in which even a Tory quoted John
Locke against a revocable parliamentary delegation.50 If an early eighteenthcentury member of Parliament, not to mention Locke himself, understood
the philosopher’s principles to bar a revocable legislative delegation, perhaps
one might hesitate before ardently insisting that Locke opposed only
irrevocable alienations of legislative power.
Thomas Rutherforth. It would be more tedious than difficult to review
and question the relevance of every quotation deployed by the Article against
nondelegation,51 but it is worth examining the treatment of Thomas
Rutherforth. This eighteenth-century English natural law theorist was
unusually sophisticated, and the Article relies upon him second only to
Locke.52
Although the Article quotes Rutherforth repeatedly on the transfer of
royal power, it only once quotes him on legislative power:
It belongs to the legislative power, considered as the common understanding,
or joint sense of the body politic, to determine and direct what is right to be
done: and it belongs to the executive power, considered as the common or joint
strength of the same body, to carry what is so determined and directed into
execution.53

From this, the Article concludes: “On this historical understanding, agency
rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization would qualify as an exercise
of executive power, for the simple but decisive reason that the agency is
carrying out legislative instructions.”54 But that is the opposite of
Rutherforth’s point. When saying that it belongs to the legislative power to
“determine and direct what is right to be done,” he is speaking of rules
governing society, not instructions to agencies to legislate.
Reinforcing this point is Rutherforth’s vision of internal executive
power as a matter of law execution. In his view, the legislature adjusts and
50

See supra text accompanying notes 41–42.
For doubts about the relevance of most of the European and American quotations that appear in
the text of the Article’s section on the delegation of legislative power, see supra notes 12–18.
52
See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 34–36 (discussing 1 T. RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF
NATURAL LAW, BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON GROTIUS DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS
318, 320 (1754–56)).
53
Id. at 40.
54
Id. at 41.
51
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settles the rights of members of the society and therefore determines when
persons have a right to law enforcement, which is much of the internal
version of executive power:
Now, as the legislative power adjusts and settles the rights of the several
members of a civil society, it naturally belongs to this power to determine how
far, and upon what occasions, they shall have a right to the interposition of the
common force; that is, it naturally belongs to this power to direct the use and
extent of the internal executive power.55

In other words, Rutherforth’s understanding that it belongs to the legislature
to “adjust[] and settle[] the rights of the several members of a civil society”
goes hand in hand with his law-execution view of domestic executive power.
There is little room in such a perspective for agency lawmaking.
What, then, can be said about the Article’s treatment of the leading
English theorists of nondelegation? The Article surely is correct in focusing
on Locke and Rutherforth.56 But whether it reads these theorists correctly is
another matter.
C. The Value of Nondelegation
The risks of misreading Locke go beyond the history of ideas. There is
also a danger of not understanding why a nondelegation principle, or
something like it, still matters in today’s world.
A Historical and Living Principle. Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s
arguments against the nondelegation doctrine tend to ignore why such a
doctrine might continue to be valuable. So, it is important to spell this out.
One reason is that nondelegation keeps the legislative power in the hands of
elected lawmakers and thus preserves the foundation of law in popular
consent. A second reason is that if the people delegate their legislative power
to the legislature, and that body can subdelegate its power to other bodies,
then the servant can almost effortlessly subvert its masters’ constitutional
choice. On both grounds, there have long been ideals, at least in England and
America, against subdelegation.
The second of these arguments against subdelegation—that it preserves
the people’s constitutional choices—deserves special attention in an essay
on constitutional law, and revealingly it was fully developed already in the
early seventeenth-century arguments against monarchical delegation of

55

RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 274.
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31–33 (discussing LOCKE, supra note 38); id. at 34–36
(discussing RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52).
56
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personal prerogatives.57 Toward the end of the century it was also employed
to argue against legislative delegation.58 It is therefore troubling that the nonondelegation position misstates the seventeenth-century theory—not
because that theory is determinative, but rather because a correct
understanding of the theory illuminates why nondelegation, or something
like it, is essential for preserving the people’s constitutional choices. Even if
there had never been such a principle, one might be inclined to invent it. It
is, in this sense, not merely a historical ideal, but one of continuing vitality—
dare one say, a living principle?
From this perspective, it is important to examine Locke’s reasoning in
more detail, for it remains relevant as a still vital response to an enduring
problem. Locke was a philosopher rather than a lawyer, and his argument
aimed to preserve the people’s choice of constitutional structure, particularly
their formation of the “legislative.”
He argued that “the constitution of the legislative” was “the original and
supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws in it, and depending
wholly on the people,” and therefore “no inferior power can alter it.”59 More
specifically, he argued that the people’s delegation of legislative power to
the legislative body precluded that body from transferring its power: “The
legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands. For
it being but a delegated power from the people, they, who have it, cannot
pass it over to others.”60
Locke argued that this principle followed not simply from their
constitution, but also from the nature of constitutions:
The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth . . . . And when
the people have said, we will submit to rules, and be govern’d by laws made by
such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws
for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by
those, whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them.61

On these assumptions about constitutional law—not to mention underlying
ideas about consent under “the law of God and nature”—there could be no

57
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 380–81 (discussing advisory opinion from 1605 on delegation of
royal dispensing power).
58
See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
59
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 3991 quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 26–28.
60
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 380 quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31.
61
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 380–81, quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31. Locke
continued: “The power of the legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and
institution, can be no other, than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and
not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and
place it in other hands.” LOCKE, supra note 38, at 381.
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subdelegation: “The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of
making laws to any body else, or place it any where but where the people
have.”62 Locke’s reasoning was broad, and it led to the clear conclusion that
the legislature could not “place” its lawmaking power “any where but where
the people have.”63
This principle and the underlying logic remain as pertinent today as in
the past. If laws are to be made with the people’s consent, they must be
enacted, without delegation, by the elected body established by the people as
their legislature. And if the legislature established by a constitution can
delegate its power, then, notwithstanding the people’s constitutional choices,
the legislature can substitute its own.
Implausible Results. Reinforcing the value of a nondelegation principle
is the sheer implausibility of the Article’s open rejection of the nondelegation
doctrine in favor of generally unfettered congressional delegation. Such a
position is both too feeble and too bold.
It is too feeble because the current nondelegation doctrine, which
employs the intelligible principle standard, already allows Congress to
delegate almost as much as it wishes. Although the doctrine purports to bar
the delegation of legislative power, it permits an agency to bind Americans
as long as Congress guides the agency with an intelligible principle.64 The
result, in reality, is to permit delegation, subject to a minimal degree of
congressional process, not any substantive limit. It is therefore unclear how
an open abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine would make much of a
difference. Certainly, it would not solve the problem faced by judges when
attempting to figure out what can be delegated and what cannot.
It is also too bold because it would candidly permit much that would be
absurd. Thus far, the nondelegation doctrine has permitted what, in fact, is
delegation of legislative power—at least to federal departments and other
agencies.65 But if there were no nondelegation doctrine, could Congress
delegate legislative power not merely to agencies but to the President, so that
he personally would make rules binding on Americans? In this eventuality,
the President alone—without expertise and, if Congress wishes, unrestrained
by any procedures—could make binding rules or laws. Legislative power
would thus be in the hands of the very person in whom the Constitution
places the veto, and a sort of partial veto would be in the legislature, thus
62

LOCKE, supra note 38, at 363, quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31 n.113.
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 363, quoted in Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 31 n.113.
64
See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404 (1928).
65
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1226 (2015) (holding Amtrak to be a
governmental agency and leaving undecided the fate of regulations by private entities).
63
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inverting the Constitution’s structure. Indeed, if there were no nondelegation
doctrine, then Congress could delegate its legislative power to private bodies,
even perhaps to my Great Aunt Gertrude.66 To state these consequences of
the permissive view of delegation is to refute it.
D. Early Federal Practices
Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s final argument in justification of
delegation rests on early federal practices. Again, the Article engages in
some conflation. In this instance, it relies on examples from Parliament,67 the
colonies,68 state legislatures,69 and the Continental Congress70 before getting
to the first Congress. But more to the point, it misunderstands what Congress
did and fails to mention what Congress did not do.
What Congress Did. The Article recounts a host of practices authorized
by early federal statutes. Of course, there is nothing unfamiliar about these
practices, which are discussed in the prior literature, including my own.71
But, as is conventional in scholarship supporting administrative power, they
are upheld as examples of the delegation of legislative power, primarily to
the executive.
These practices include the following:
• Determinations of facts (including tax assessments, customs
determinations, and presidential determinations under conditional
statutes)72
66
The Article’s vision of the breadth of congressional power to delegate is evident from its account
of how early “regulatory delegations were limited only by the will and judgment of the legislature.”
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 61.
67
See id.
68
Id. at 67–68.
69
Id. at 62–63.
70
Id. at 63–67.
71
See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 79–81 (suspending and dispensing); id. at 85–89
(executive regulations, instructions, and orders); id. at 89–95 (executive interpretation); id. at 95–97
(military orders); id. at 100–02 (determinations); id. at 104–07 (licensing regulations); id. at 107–110
(determinations of facts); id. at 192–93 (executive adjudication concerning nonsubjects); id. at 193–203
(executive adjudication concerning benefits or other privileges); id. at 203–05, 208–11 (executive
adjudication as a means of determining and giving notice of duties); id. at 211–15 (executive role of
judges); id. at 215–17 (coercive and other physical acts by executive officers); id. at 217–19 (nonbinding
orders and warrants); id. at 220–22 (executive orders to appear, testify, or produce records); id. at 222–
24 (reporting, record keeping, and inspection).
72
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 83–85 (tax assessments); id. at 84 (paying duties or bonds
to the satisfaction of customs inspector); id. at 99 (presidential determinations under conditional statutes).
But factual determinations were permitted only in narrow circumstances and were understood to involve
discretion in the sense of judgment rather than lawmaking will. HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 100–02
(determinations); id. at 107–10 (determinations of facts).
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• Executive inspection and seizure (notably by customs officers)73
• The selection of locations (for post offices, post roads, and district
boundaries)74
• Delegated legislation in federal enclaves where Congress enjoys local
power (such as the District of Columbia and the territories)75
• Executive rulemaking regarding the distribution of various benefits
and other privileges (ranging from pensions to patents)76
• Executive licensing regulation of trade with Indian tribes.77

73
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 84–85 (executive inspection and seizure by customs
officers). But these were executive acts conducted under statutory authorization. See, e.g., HAMBURGER,
supra note 7, at 222–24 (inspections).
74
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 95 (post offices); id. at 92–94 (post roads); id. at 96 (district
boundaries). But the Constitution does not clearly make the specification of such locations a matter of
legislative power. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o establish Post
Offices and post Roads”) (emphasis added).
75
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 72–75 (delegating legislation in federal enclaves where
Congress enjoyed local power such as the District of Columbia and the territories). But far from revealing
that Congress may delegate its power to the national Executive, the treatment of these places merely
shows that Congress could recognize the power of the people in these localities to govern themselves
through local bodies. HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 389. Incidentally, Professors Mortenson and Bagley
interpret the Constitution to give Congress authority to “exercise exclusive legislation [in the capital
district] in all cases whatsoever”—meaning, in their view, that the Constitution “prohibit[s] delegations
of legislative power.” Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 73. They never pause to consider that the
Constitution thereby aimed to give Congress a legislative power exclusive of the states. HAMBURGER,
supra note 7, at 389.
76
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 80–82 (pensions); id. at 75 (patents). But these, at least
formally, were privileges, not binding regulations. See HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 193–203 (executive
adjudication concerning benefits or other privileges, including patents).
77
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 77–78. According to Professors Mortenson and Bagley, my
work “dismisses” the licensing regulation of Indian traders “for the curious reason that ‘persons, such as
Indian traders, were not entirely subject to domestic law.’” Id. at 79, n.286. They then respond that “it’s
a tautology that a nation’s laws do not apply to someone not subject to those laws.” Id. But it only seems
a tautology because Mortenson and Bagley truncate my argument to the point of depriving it of its meat.
My argument was fundamentally about the limited reach of American law beyond the nation’s
borders—about its limited reach as to “persons and things that, in various ways, went beyond the territory
or shores of the United States.” HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 104. Adding to such concerns, Indian
traders were persons not all of whom “considered themselves subjects of the United States, and even
those who were subjects tended to venture into the territory of nations that often considered themselves
distinct from the United States.” Id. The application of federal law in relation to Indian nations remains a
complex question, and nothing about this is tautological.
The larger point is that Mortenson and Bagley take an exceptional situation involving cross-border
conduct to be suggestive of what was normal in national regulation of domestic matters, and that is simply
false. Yes, there was regulatory licensing of Indian traders and of a range of vessels, in which the
Executive was authorized to frame regulatory conditions or rules regarding the availability of licenses.
But, as I have pointed out, and Mortenson and Bagley do not deny, it is difficult to find early instances in
which Congress authorized the Executive to regulate nationally in domestic matters by specifying
licensing conditions. Id. at 107; PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 48–49 (2017).
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My scholarship has already explained why these are not instances of
delegated legislative power.78 Here, it is enough to observe that these
instances do not really support Mortenson and Bagley’s position.
One might argue that even if the Article’s list of early federal practices
reveals some delegation, it should be no surprise that practices sometimes
depart from principles. On this obvious assumption, one should not discount
the Constitution’s principles because of minor or occasional deviations. Nor
should one expand such deviations into exceptions or counter principles that
swallow the rule. But true as all of this may be, none of it is the main
objection to Mortenson and Bagley’s reliance on early federal practices.
Constraints on Private Persons vs. Legal Obligation. Before getting to
the main objection, it is important to avoid getting tripped up by a conceptual
mistake—which the Article correctly attributes to many originalists79 but
should not attribute to me—namely, that what the Executive could not do
was to affect private conduct or alter private rights. From this perspective, it
makes sense that the Executive in the early years of the Republic did not
make binding rules or adjudications. At the same time, it is puzzling from
this point of view that, even with statutory authorization, the Executive made
determinations of facts (tax assessments, customs determinations, and
presidential determinations) and that it imposed executive inspection and
seizure (mostly by customs officers).80 It is also puzzling from this point of
view that executive regulations were not binding on executive officers, but
could be enforced merely by dismissing uncooperative officers.81
Yet none of this is much of a mystery if one recognizes a different set
of underlying assumptions: that a central element of legislative power is to
make binding rules, that judicial power involves making binding
adjudications, and that executive power is the nation’s action, strength, or
force. On these foundations, it makes sense that the Executive made
determinations, inspections, and searches, but not legally binding rules or
adjudications. And it makes sense that executive regulations did not legally
bind executive officers but could be enforced through removal.
In other words, when the line between legislative power and executive
power is drawn by barring the Executive from limiting private conduct or
altering private rights, much gets lost. This is a crude summary of something

78

For brief hints of my prior explanations of such alleged instances of delegation, see infra notes

79–85.
79
80
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more interesting: that executive power is the nation’s force and does not
include the power to create rules or adjudications with legal obligation.
Having cleared this up, one can understand the real import of the early
federal practices that, according to the Article, were delegations of legislative
power.
What Congress Did Not Do. What is missing from the Mortenson and
Bagley article is what Congress did not do. To be precise, the Article does
not point to any early instance when the Executive, with or without
congressional authorization, made binding rules or adjudications that were
national and domestic in their scope. None. Not one.
In other words, the Article does not produce a single example of early
federal executive action that falls squarely within the sort of national
domestic regulation that is at the heart of the dispute over administrative
power. Instead, it treats as legislative and judicial all sorts of actions that
could reasonably be considered within the scope of executive power. Some
actions (such as customs inspections and seizures or executive regulations
instructing officers) were clearly within executive power, even if the
inspections and seizures needed statutory authorization.82 Other actions (such
as factual determinations) were ordinarily within executive power, and
though they occasionally strayed into legislative territory, it should be no
surprise that the typical assumption, that they were executive, generally
prevailed.83
Once one gets past the practices that were within executive power, the
evidence becomes elusive. Where are the early federal examples of binding
rules or adjudications that were national and domestic? They are difficult to
discern.
Consider the Treasury: The first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander
Hamilton, was not shy about espousing expansive federal power. But a close
examination of manuscript Treasury records (which I pursued for my book
on administrative power) reveals that neither he nor his successors, until late
in the nineteenth century, issued rules or other instructions that purported to
impose legal obligation.84 For example, Hamilton and his subordinates issued
copious rules and other instructions for customs officers, but even as to them,
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See supra note 72.
See supra note 71.
84
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 86–88 (describing executive regulations, instructions, and orders
directing officers, but that were not legally binding on them or the public—compliance being obtained
only by threat of dismissal); id. at 89–95 (regarding executive interpretation directing subordinates within
departments, but not legally binding on them or the public).
83
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such rules and instructions were not legally binding.85 Instead, they were
merely directions that were enforced with threats of dismissal.86
So, please forgive a Hamburger for asking: Where’s the beef? Not in
the Article. Not in other scholarship supportive of administrative power. And
not in the very extensive early federal evidence I have studied.87 If there was
a dog, isn’t it strange that it did not bark?
E. Not Merely Delegation and Nondelegation, but Vesting and Divesting
One of the curiosities of Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s Article is
its assumption of direct continuity between European thought and American
law—such that their misreading of European delegation theory becomes the
Constitution’s delegation theory, without consideration of what the
Constitution actually said. In fact, though the Constitution echoes Lockean
anti-delegation principles, it uses different phrasing, thereby establishing its
own distinctive version of the old nondelegation analysis.
Rather than speak generically of delegation—let alone, alienation or
transfer—the Constitution says “shall be vested.”88 Indeed, not once, nor
twice, but three times, the Constitution vests its different powers in the
different branches of government.89 It thereby speaks more forcefully than
prior anti-delegation theories and does not leave its meaning to be implied
from such theories.
The nondelegation doctrine frames its limitation on transfers of power
in terms that obscure the Constitution’s vesting principle. For one thing, the
nondelegation doctrine leaves the impression that the limit on transfers of
power is merely a matter of judicial doctrine, rather than the Constitution
itself. This in turn invites speculation about the doctrine’s origins in preconstitutional European theory about delegation, which draws attention
further away from the Constitution’s principle. Though pre-constitutional
European theory about delegation is important for understanding the
Constitution and the dangers of permitting shifts in power, the Constitution
speaks more emphatically about vesting its powers.
Thus, in the Constitution, the generic nondelegation principle becomes
a more specific matter of vesting. This is not to say it is entirely wrong to
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Id. at 86–87, 90–91, 93.
Id.
87
My book draws on a host of American sources, printed and manuscript, in much greater depth than
the Article. Without always spelling this out in the text, the book makes use of extensive research on early
federal statutes and regulations, early state manuscript records, and the mass of early manuscript Treasury
records in the National Archives.
88
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
89
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, cl. 1, art. III, § 1.
86
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generalize about the people’s delegation of legislative powers to Congress
and the consequent nondelegation principle. Delegation was the language of
much political theory, and the Constitution’s vesting language builds upon
such theory. So, it is no surprise that Americans have always tended to talk
about the problem in terms of delegation. But it is more accurate and specific
to recognize that the people of the United States “vested” the nation’s
legislative powers in Congress and thereby precluded Congress from vesting
in others, or divesting itself of, such powers.90
This reframing of the problem in the Constitution’s terms has many
advantages. It places the solution on a more solid foundation than either
earlier European ideas or later American judicial doctrine. It recognizes that
the problem is not merely congressional, but general to all branches of
government—that it arises whenever any power is hived off from any branch
of government. And it avoids a strange inquiry into whether Congress can
“delegate” judicial power to administrative agencies—as if Congress could
delegate a power that does not belong to it. A nondelegation doctrine cannot
speak to legislative transfers of judicial power. Therefore, it is fortunate that
the Constitution recognizes that in such instances Congress is vesting in
agencies, and divesting the courts of, the power that the Constitution vests in
the courts.
The inadequacy of delegation talk is especially clear because, when
Congress transfers its powers, it cannot always recall them. A delegated
power is one that can be resumed at the will or discretion of the delegator.91
When the Secretary of the Interior, for example, delegates some of her
powers to a subordinate, she can recall her power at her own discretion.92
Similarly, when Congress delegates authority to the Congressional Budget
Office, it has full discretion to retrieve any of the delegated authority. But
when Congress authorizes the Executive to exercise legislative power, even
if only temporarily, Congress cannot predictably recover that power, as it
may have to overcome a Presidential veto.93 It thus becomes clear that
congressional shifts of legislative power to the Executive cannot accurately
be considered delegations—this being yet another reason why it is fitting that
the Constitution speaks of vesting rather than delegating.

90

See Brief of The New Civil Liberties Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–10,
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 17-6086), 2018 WL 2684383, [hereinafter NCLA
Gundy Brief]. I am grateful to Jonathan Mitchell for bringing to my attention the point about discretion
in delegation.
91
See id. at 6.
92
See id.
93
See id.
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In sum, a focus on vesting more sharply delineates what is at stake.
Although the Constitution could have simply echoed the old language about
delegating powers, it instead more accurately and emphatically vested
powers in the branches of government.94 And precisely because of the
historical prevalence of delegation analysis, it is especially clear that the
Constitution is not merely echoing delegation talk when focusing on vesting.
This locution has at least two implications. First, because the
Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, Congress cannot vest
any such powers elsewhere. Second, Congress cannot divest itself of the
powers that the Constitution vests in it. A full exposition of these points must
await another publication. But even in this Essay, it should be possible to
anticipate how much might flow from the Constitution’s use of language
about vested powers in place of the more familiar language about delegated
powers.
II. NOT AN EMPTY VESSEL, BUT THE NATION’S ACTION, STRENGTH, OR
FORCE
One ordinarily might stop here, but in the course of justifying the
delegation of legislative power, the Mortenson and Bagley article also says
much about executive power. The Article proposes that the Constitution’s
executive power was historically an “empty vessel.”95 It adds that this was a
power to “execute law,” by which the Article means, however, the power of
carrying out legislative authorizations or instructions.96 The definition of
executive power thus seems to confirm the legitimacy of delegating
legislative power.
To be precise, the Article argues that “[t]he founders unanimously
understood executive power as the narrow but potent authority to carry out
projects defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power,” and then quotes
Rutherforth in support, as if he were a “founder.”97 On this sort of foundation,
the Article claims that “the executive power was simply the power to execute
the laws—an empty vessel for Congress to fill, rather than a subject matter
category with a well-defined set of real-world referents.”98 Accordingly, “it’s
not just confused but incoherent to ask whether an executive action is so
legislative in nature as to fall outside of that basket. Any action authorized
by law was an exercise of ‘executive power’ inasmuch as it served to execute
94

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 4.
96
Id. (“[T]he executive power was simply the power to execute the laws—an empty vessel for
Congress to fill.”).
97
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 40–41 (emphasis added).
98
Id. at 4–5 (echoing an earlier article by Mortenson: Mortenson, supra note 6, at 1234).
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the law.”99 It sounds like a powerful attack on nondelegation, but the
foundation—the assumption about executive power—is rather shaky.
A. Action, Strength, or Force
Another definition, which was familiar in the eighteenth century,
viewed executive power as a nation’s lawful action, strength, or force.
This definition has deep foundations in European philosophy, which
long distinguished between the two faculties of the soul or mind—will and
judgment—and contrasted these with action, strength, or force, which was
the faculty or capacity of the body.100 Indeed, these tripartite faculties of an
individual became the basis for recognizing such powers—including
executive action, strength, or force—in the people and ultimately in their
government.101
Executive power thus could be described simply as a nation’s force, in
the sense of its physical actions, in contrast to its legislative will or its judicial
judgments. Such force included not merely warfare, but all sorts of physical
activity, including speech, the conduct of prosecutions in court, the
enforcement of judgments, distraint, and the purchasing of supplies.102
But the Article (and the earlier scholarship by Professor Mortenson on
which it relies) does not really consider the possibility of lawful executive
action, strength, or force. It is not even mentioned as a competing definition
of executive power.103
Strikingly, this old vision of executive power is plainly evident from
one of the Article’s own quotations. The Article quotes Rousseau on the
“body politic” to the effect that “force and will are distinguished, will under
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Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 5.
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 327. Will was alternatively understood as passion, and judgment
as intellect or understanding. Force could be viewed as action or strength. For will and judgment, see
NORMAN FIERING, MORAL PHILOSOPHY AT SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HARVARD 106–09 (1981); PHILIP
HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 159–60 (2008); Dan D. Crawford, Intellect and Will in
Augustine’s Confessions, 24 RELIGIOUS STUD. 291 (1988); Norman S. Fiering, Will and Intellect in the
New England Mind, 29 WILLIAM & MARY Q. 523, 529–30 (1972). For force or what has been translated
in Aquinas as the sovereign’s “coercive power,” including the coercion of law, see, for example, THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II.I, question 96, art. 5, at 2326 (Christian Classics Ethereal Library,
1981) (1274).
101
HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 327.
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Of course, there was disagreement about the division of government powers, as some theorists
considered the judicial power to be part of the executive power. But even these commentators—as evident
from Locke and Rutherforth—could view executive power as the nation’s force. See infra notes 114, 124.
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Mortenson’s earlier work comes closest when it says that “executive power has never been
anything less than the nation’s force mustered in service of the nation’s will.” Mortenson, supra note 6,
1271. But this seems more a statement of realism than a recognition that executive power is defined as
the nation’s lawful action, strength, or force.
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the name of legislative power and force under that of executive power.”104
From this quotation it is apparent that executive power is the “force” of the
body politic. But not having even entertained such a possibility, the Article
persists in its empty vessel and law-executing definition.
More pertinent for Americans, the Article quotes Rutherforth:
It belongs to the legislative power, considered as the common understanding,
or joint sense of the body politic, to determine and direct what is right to be
done: and it belongs to the executive power, considered as the common or joint
strength of the same body, to carry what is so determined and directed into
execution.105

This quotation sounds promising for the law-execution and empty vessel
theory; and recall that the Article views the quotation as justifying “agency
rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization.”106 But this twists
Rutherforth to justify delegation.
For starters, Rutherforth viewed executive power not merely as law
execution, but as the society’s “joint strength.”107 Second, he did not embrace
the delegation of legislative power to the executive, for he thought that “the
executive power, in the nature of the thing, is not discretionary in any part.”108
Third, he recognized that constitutions could vary from the assumption he
drew from nature, and he argued that constitutions frequently had to leave
the executive wide discretion, unconfined by legislation, in the external or
foreign application of the society’s joint strength.109
When applied internally, the society’s joint strength served to protect
rights and duties, and when applied externally, it more broadly protected
against foreign threats.110 As Rutherforth explained:
Now, the executive power is a power of acting with this joint strength, in order
to obtain the purposes for which such strength was formed. And, consequently,

104
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 25. Indeed, Mortenson’s earlier work relies on Rousseau’s
similar statement: “The body politic has . . . two motive powers—and we can make the same distinction
between will and strength—the former is legislative power and the latter executive power.” Mortenson,
supra note 6, at 1235.
105
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 40–41.
106
Id. at 41.
107
See quotation in text at supra note 105.
108
RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 279.
109
See infra text accompanying notes 111–16.
110
Rutherforth also wrote: “The natural use of the joint strength which a civil society forms, is either
to preserve the rights and enforce the duties of the members of such society, in respect of one another,
and of the public; or else to protect the whole and the several parts of it against such injuries as other civil
societies, or other individuals, who still continue in a state of nature, or who are members of other civil
societies might do them; to prevent such injuries from proceeding, where they are begun; or to procure
reparation, and inflict punishment, where they are completed.” RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 273.
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the executive power is either internal or external. We may call it internal, when
it is exercised upon objects within the society; when it is employed in securing
the rights, or enforcing the duties of the several members, in respect either of
one another, or of the society itself. And we may call it external executive
power, when it is exercised upon objects out of the society; when it is employed
in protecting either the body or the several members of it against external
injuries, in preventing such injuries from being done, or in procuring reparation,
or in inflicting punishment for them, after they are done.111

Thus, whereas the Article claims that Rutherforth has a law-executing
definition of executive power, in the sense that the executive carries out
legislative authorizations and instructions, Rutherforth reveals that he views
executive power as a matter of the society’s joint strength—a power that
internally is confined to securing rights and enforcing duties, but that is not
always so confined externally.
That Rutherforth thought much external executive power was not a
matter of carrying out legislative directives is further evident from his
account of an executive’s constitutional discretion. In many societies, he
observed, the executive needed the constitution to assure areas of executive
discretion or prerogative—internally in pardons, and externally in matters of
war, peace, and treaties:
[W]here the legislative and executive power are lodged in different hands, it is
usual, especially if the legislative body is a large one, to allow those who have
the executive power, to act discretionally in some cases; that is, it is usual for
them to have, in some instances, such a discretionary power as is called
prerogative.112

By “prerogative,” Rutherforth meant a discretionary power. The
“constitution of government” was what authorized and protected this
discretion, primarily in external issues.113 He thus anticipated that an
executive might enjoy substantial realms of constitutionally authorized
discretion in exercising his nation’s strength externally—a discretion that,
being constitutional, cannot easily be understood as “simply the power to
execute the laws—an empty vessel for Congress to fill.”114
In other words, the Article persistently misreads Rutherforth. It fails to
recognize his conception of executive power as the society’s joint strength.
In quoting him on the domestic application of executive power, it fails to see
111

RUTHERFORTH, supra note 52, at 273–74. See also Rutherforth’s comment about understanding
“the notion of executive power to consist in a power of using and applying the joint force of a civil
society.” Id. at 275.
112
Id. at 280 (echoing LOCKE supra note 38, at 392–93).
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Id. at 279–80.
114
Id. at 4–5 (echoing an earlier article by Mortenson: Mortenson, supra note 6, at 1234).
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that his law-executing vision precludes the delegation of legislative power.
And as to the external application of executive power, the Article omits to
mention Rutherforth’s view of constitutionally established discretionary
executive power, which did not involve the execution of congressional
instructions.
The methodological point is that, not for the first time, the Article fails
to consider the range of competing views evident among European theorists.
As I have written elsewhere:
The definition of executive power . . . remained open to dispute even as late as
the founding of the United States.
Some commentators understood it to be at least the power of executing
the law, and from this perspective they said it was ministerial. . . . Others
recognized that, if this power was not legislative or judicial . . . it was the entire
power of exercising the physical force of the government.115

If the Article had simply been more careful in reading the authors it quotes,
it might have noticed that some Europeans defined executive power as the
nation’s action, strength, or force.116
B. The Constitution
Of course, European theory is not the same as the Constitution. Though
the framers were familiar with at least some European theories, they made
their own choices. In fact, the Framers made deliberate departures from
European theory and practice in many instances. So, whatever the weight of
different opinions in different parts of Europe, one must ultimately focus on
the Constitution, its framing, and its ratification.
Where does this more focused inquiry lead? Not to a law-executing
power, let alone an empty vessel.
In accord with what was already the conventional default mode of
conveying powers,117 the Constitution vests the executive power in the
President, and then clarifies or adjusts this power with various additions and
limitations, including the limit that the President “shall take Care that the
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HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 328 n.a.
Ideas of force also underlay John Locke’s vision. He explained:

Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in
themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed, at the same time, in the hands of
distinct persons. For both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands. . . .
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 384.
117
For the default allocation of power, including discussions from before the adoption of the
Constitution, see HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 328–30.
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Laws be faithfully executed.”118 The Constitution thus addresses law
execution as one of the President’s duties, not as one of his powers. A lawexecuting authority undoubtedly could be implied from the duty, but this
only reinforces the difference between the executive power and the authority
to execute the law. Evidently, the Constitution does not consider the lawexecuting authority to be the same as the executive power. This means either
that the law-executing authority stands apart from the executive power or,
much more probably, that it is merely an element of the executive power—
all of which is consistent with the view that the executive power is the
nation’s action, strength, or force.
Reinforcing this conclusion is Alexander Hamilton’s statement in
Federalist No. 78 that the Constitution divides the government’s powers into
those of “force,” “will,” and “judgment”—that is, executive force, legislative
will, and judicial judgment.119 The Article does not even mention this
statement. Yet the Federalist was the most widely circulated and admired
exposition of the Constitution during its ratification, and the distribution of
the Federalist was thought to be crucial for the Constitution’s adoption.120 Its
summary of executive power is therefore significant. Amid evidence of
contested European opinions, one must look at the Constitution and its
framing and ratification to understand the choices made by Americans, and
there is little better evidence from the ratification than the Federalist.
What is one to say about a discussion of executive power that does not
wrestle with the Constitution’s language? Or that does not mention the
possibility, notably discussed even in the Federalist, that executive power
is the nation’s action, strength, or force?
This much is clear: it is difficult to understand the Constitution’s
executive power merely as a matter of executing the law. And it is more than
slightly mistaken to assert that “[t]he founders unanimously understood
executive power as the narrow but potent authority to carry out projects
defined by a prior exercise of the legislative power.”121 On both grounds, the
118
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121
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 40 (emphasis added).
119

115

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Article’s vision of executive power is a poor basis for attacking
nondelegation.
III. FROM MISDIRECTED ATTACKS TO A RELEVANT DEBATE
The Article’s attack on the nondelegation doctrine is strangely
misplaced. Rather than challenging decaying Supreme Court doctrine on
nondelegation or offering improbable visions of what the Executive can do,
the debate needs to come to terms with the Constitution’s principles of
vesting and executive power.
The Article is misdirected both personally and conceptually. The
Article takes aim at my 2014 book for attempting to “give originalist bone
fides to the nondelegation doctrine.”122 But this is puzzling. For one thing,
my book expressly disclaims reliance on originalism.123 More centrally, I
have always opposed the nondelegation doctrine.
My 2014 book already argued that “it is utterly misleading to frame the
debate in terms of ‘the nondelegation doctrine’”—because “the focus on ‘the
nondelegation doctrine’ reduces the controversy to one of mere doctrine, as
if no larger principle were at stake.”124 More recently, my arguments have
gone further, observing that the Constitution does not speak in terms of
delegation and nondelegation. Instead, it vests its powers. It thus must be
considered whether a congressional transfer of legislative powers violates
the Constitution’s vesting of such powers in Congress and, in addition,
divests Congress of the power vested in it.125
122

Id. at 15 (“The latest installment in the campaign to give originalist bona fides to the
nondelegation doctrine came in Philip Hamburger’s Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, published in
2014.”).
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HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 10 (“[A]lthough some defenses of administrative law complain
about original intent, this inquiry rests on something closer to original sin. Whatever one thinks about
intent—especially if one fears it as a return to the constitutional past—it should be kept in mind that this
inquiry focuses on something very different: the danger that the government already has returned to the
preconstitutional past. Thus, rather than appeal to any interpretative doctrine, whether the living
constitution or original intent, this book draws attention to one of the central dangers that prompted the
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here mainly concerns the revival of a historically dangerous sort of power.”).
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campaign to give originalist bona fides to the nondelegation doctrine came in Philip Hamburger’s Is
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people already delegated it once. Adherents of the nondelegation doctrine must therefore be arguing for
a non-redelegation principle.” Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 1, at 27. Curiously, that is exactly my
position, for my book prominently argues that “the difficulty is not delegation, but subdelegation.”
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The Article’s failure to engage with the vesting and divesting point is
all the more striking because it frames its argument as a response to Gundy
v. United States and especially Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion.126 That
is precisely the case in which I argued that the Court should abandon the
nondelegation doctrine and instead recognize that the Constitution bars any
divesting of its powers.127 That is also the case in which Justice Gorsuch
moved toward this argument, saying “we have an obligation to decide
whether Congress has unconstitutionally divested itself of its legislative
responsibilities” and that “Congress may not divest itself of its legislative
power by transferring that power to an executive agency.”128
What, then, is one to make of an article that does not even notice the
implications of the Constitution’s vesting of powers?129 If the debate was
really still the same as in the 1930s, the Article would be on point. But given
that the debate is evolving in its focus from delegation and nondelegation to
vesting and divesting, an attack on nondelegation seems at best a
distraction—an assault more on the dead than the living.
Similarly, in ignoring the possibility that executive power is the nation’s
action, strength, or force, the Article does not address the strongest
alternative point of view. Unlike the Constitution’s vesting of powers, the
vision of executive power as the nation’s action, strength, or force has not
yet risen to prominence in a judicial opinion. But that is not to say it is
entirely obscure.130 And it is distinctively consistent with both the
Constitution and the lived experience of the Executive, from the founding to
the present. Rather than confront this perspective, however, the Article takes
aim at more stereotyped and vulnerable arguments. The result, once again,
is an odd failure to engage with the arguments that demand attention.
What is needed are debates not about strawmen, but about the
Constitution’s principles of vesting and executive power. These principles
are evident from the Constitution itself, and they echo notable prior theories.
There is no excuse for ignoring them.

HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 377. Indeed, an entire chapter is entitled “Subdelegated.” The point is not
that the Article needs to cite my book, but rather that it should not generalize about the “nonsense”
propounded by other scholars.
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CONCLUSION
It has been seen that Professors Mortenson and Bagley’s article is
problematic on several grounds. Most basically, its own evidence often
contradicts its conclusions. Equally telling is the evidence it omits—whether
in European theory, the Constitution, or the Federalist. Underlying all of this
is a deeper failure to explore ideas with greater openness to alternative
viewpoints. Indeed, the Article does not even respond to the strongest and
most recent arguments on the other side—it does not even mention them.
All the same, the Mortenson and Bagley article is conceptually
valuable, for it serves as a reminder of the possibilities it leaves unexplored.
This Essay, therefore, recalls a pair of inadequately appreciated
constitutional principles. First, rather than generically delegate its powers,
the Constitution more specifically vests them. It thereby bars Congress from
vesting its powers in other bodies and from divesting itself of such powers.
Second, the Constitution establishes an executive power that is not confined
to law execution, but that instead encompasses the nation’s action, strength,
or force.
Of course, this Essay can only briefly present the logic and
constitutional foundation of these ideas. But there is much to be said for
them, and they now at least have been tabled in such a manner that they can
no longer be brushed aside.
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